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INTRODUCTION

'

"There is room for debate about whether the election ofstate courtjudges
is a goodidea or a bad one.
Over-politicization, exemplified by the infusion of money into state judicial
elections, has moved some to discredit elective selection as an efficacious method
2
for selecting independent, impartial state supreme court judges and justices. But
3
criticism of elective judicial selection is nothing new. Some scholars not only
criticize the efficacy of popular election of judges, but also assert that it violates the
United States Constitution. 4 Criticism of popular election of judges has not
bypassed Kentucky.s In fact, such criticism has inspired state bar programming and
legislative reform, as well as framed recent United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence.' Whether those who discredit popular election as an efficacious
method for selecting state supreme court judges and justices have properly placed
their criticism might depend on a state's existing framework for regulating its
supreme court elections and the electoral and political realities of those elections.'
This Article explores whether those who discredit Kentucky's judicial selection
1Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 209 (6th Cir. 2010).

2 See Sandra Day O'Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74 MO. L.
REV. 479, 480-81, 486-89 (2009) (identifying judicial impartiality and judicial independence as goals of
judicial selection, decrying the infusion of politics into electoral judicial selection, and citing studies that
show that an overwhelming majority of the public believes campaign contributions influence state
judges).
I Among the critics of elective judicial selection is the Honorable Sue Bell Cobb, former Chief
Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, who scrutinizes the popular selection of judges critically and
with condemnation. See Sue Bell Cobb, I Was Alabama's Top Judge. Im Ashamed by What I Had to
Do

to

Get

There.,

POLITICO

MAG.,

March/April
55

2015,

03
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/judicial-elections-fundraising-11
[https:/perma.cc/FDQ8-KJ6D] ("[Plublic trust is eroded when judicial candidates are forced to court
big donors and spenders.").
4 SeegeneralyMonroe H. Freedman, The UnconstitutionalityofElecting StateJudges, 26 GEO.J.
LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2013) (opining that the election and reelection of state judges violates due process
as guaranteed by the 5th and 14' Amendments). But see Ed Haden & Conrad Anderson, IV, Electing
State Judges Unpleasant but Not Unconstitutional, ENGAGE, June 2008, at 132 (responding to
complaints that electoral judicial selection offends the Constitution).
s See generally Andrew Mize, Note, When Lady justice Sought Her Sight: JudicialSelection in
Kentucky in Light ofRecent Trends and Carey v. Wolnitzek, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 383 (2011)
(discussing the balance between free speech and the desire for judicial independence); Benjamin R.
Hardy, Note, Judicial Selection Question: Why Is It Time for Preemptive Reform of Kentuckys
Judicial Selection Method?, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 379 (2014) (arguing that the influence of
political donations in popular election of judges threatens judicial independence and offering potential
reforms to protect judicial independence).
6 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662-68, 1673 (2015); Amy Carman, 2012
KHA Annual Convention FeaturesRetired Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day O'Connor, a Supreme
Court Review and a Historic Flm Screening on Nuremberg Trials, KY. B. ASSN BENCH & B., July
2012, at 9; Cary Stemle, Approachingthe Bench, LOUISVILLE MAG., Mar. 2012, at 60.

This Article uses the phrase "state supreme court" to refer to a state's highest court-, it refers to
states' supreme court judges and justices collectively as "justices."
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system have misplaced their criticism. In so doing, this Article advocates thatbecause the framework that regulates Kentucky's Supreme Court elections
efficaciously controls over-politicization
and promotes impartiality and
independence-Kentucky should retain nonpartisan elective selection of Kentucky's
Supreme Court justices. This Article recognizes, however, that Kentucky must also
take steps to revise statutory controls on over-politicization undermined by recent
court precedent.
Generally, this Article defends the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection,
particularly in Kentucky where a protective regulatory framework controls overpoliticization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections. Part I outlines Kentucky's
system for selecting Supreme Court justices and summarizes the alternative
selection systems used in other states. Part II relies on legislative and other sources
to narrate the history ofjudicial selection in Kentucky, answering why, in 1974, the
legislature proposed nonpartisan elective selection instead of alternative selection
systems. Part III measures whether Kentucky's system for judicial selection works
effectively, specifically whether the framework that regulates judicial elections
sufficiently controls over-politicization. Finally, Part IV finds that nonpartisan
elective selection promotes impartiality and independence and advocates for its
retention.

I. How KENTUCKY'S NONPARTISAN ELECTIVE SELECTION SYSTEM
COMPARES TO ALTERNATIVE SELECTION SYSTEMS

"

"[Tihebill envisioneda four-tieredcourt structurewith the Supreme Court
at itshead... . [Jiudges would continue to be elected,
but would do so in non-partisanelections.
Section A identifies how Kentucky selects its Supreme Court justices. Section B
describes alternative state supreme court selection systems.9
A. How Kentucky Selects its Supreme CourtJustices
The Kentucky Constitution provides for nonpartisan elective selection of
Kentucky Supreme Court justices.'o Upon its ratification in November 1975, the
Judicial Article restructured Kentucky's Court of Justice by establishing a

I Kurt X. Metzmeier, A ConstitutionalAmendent [sic] to Reform Kentucky's Courts, in KURT X.
METZMEIER WITH MICHAEL WHITEMAN & JASON NEMES, UNITED AT LAST: THE JUDICIAL
ARTICLE AND THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM KENTJCKY'S COURTS 33 (Kurt X. Metzmeier ed., 2006).

' Part II(B) does not consider how states fill supreme court vacancies. See infra Part IV(C)
(describing the procedure Kentucky uses to fill a supreme court vacancy as a constraint on overpoliticization of nonpartisan elective selection).

KY. CONST. § 117 (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative Session).
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hierarchical Supreme Court." Specifically, the Judicial Article exclusively vests the
judicial power of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in one "Court of Justice," with a
Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction at its head.1 2 The Kentucky Supreme
Court consists of seven justices elected on a nonpartisan basis, one from each of
seven districts. " From each district, one justice is popularly elected on a
nonpartisan basis for an eight-year term.' 4 A Kentucky Supreme Court Justice may
serve unlimited terms." The elective selection system is not unique to Kentucky.
B. How OtherStates Select Their Supreme CourtJustices
i. Elective Selection
Twenty-four states, including Kentucky, directly or indirectly (by legislative
election) involve the electorate when initially selecting justices of the highest
appellate state court. " In these states, voters select justices in partisan or
nonpartisan elections, or select the state legislators who fill their state supreme
courts. Fourteen states accompany Kentucky in using direct, nonpartisan, popular
election to select their high-court justices. " Of the fifteen states that use
nonpartisan elective selection, seven elect supreme court justices to six-year terms;
six states, including Kentucky, elect justices for eight-year terms; and two states
elect justices to ten-year terms."
Seven states use direct, partisan, popular election to select their state supreme
court justices." Three of these states elect justices by partisan election for ten-year
terms, two states have six-year terms, one state has an eight-year term, and one

11 Id. §§ 109-124. See asso Joseph E. Lambert, Introduction to KURT X. METZMEIER WITH
MICHAEL WHITEMAN & JASON NEMES, UNITED AT LAST: THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE AND THE
STRUGGLE TO REFORM KENTUCKY'S COURTS 10 (Kurt X. Metzmeier ed., 2006).

CONST. §§ 109, 110(2)(a) (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative Session).
Id. §§ 110, 117. Although Kentucky initially used the existing Kentucky Court of Appeals
districts as the Kentucky Supreme Court districts, the General Assembly later redistricted the
Commonwealth "into seven Supreme Court districts as nearly equal in population and as compact in
form as possible." Id. § 110(4).
14
Id. § 119.
* See id. (limiting terms of Supreme Court justices to eight years, but not limiting the number of
terms).
16
See
Methods
of
Judicial Selection,
NAT'L
CTR.
FOR
ST.
CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/methods/selection-of judges.cfm?state
[https://perma.cc/3LUH-VLN2] (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
17 Id. (Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin).
s Id. (Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington elect for six-year
terms; Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, and North Carolina elect for eight-year
terms; North Dakota and Wisconsin elect for ten-year terms).
" Id. (Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia).
2 KY.
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state elects its justices to twelve-year terms.20 Of the seven states that use partisan
elective selection, five hold elections statewide, while two states demarcate elections
inside supreme court districts.2 1 For subsequent supreme court terms, three of these
seven states use retention elections, in which the electorate votes to retain or reject
the incumbent.'
Finally, three states use their legislatures to select supreme court justices.' Thus,
constituents-through the legislators whom they directly elect-indirectly select
the justices of the state supreme court. In South Carolina, a joint, public vote by
the General Assembly selects state supreme court justices for ten-year terms.2 4
Election to a full, twelve-year term on the Virginia Supreme Court requires a
majority of each house of the General Assembly; subsequent terms also require
legislative reelection.2 5
ii. Appointive Selection
Apart from elective selection, alternative systems for selecting state supreme
court justices exist. Indeed, Judge Daniel R. Deja identifies four "primary methods"
for selecting state high-court jurists two of which are gubernatorial appointment
and gubernatorial appointment followed by a retention election.' Twenty-six states
initially select their supreme court justices by gubernatorial appointment or
27
gubernatorial nomination.
No state provides for unilateral, unfettered gubernatorial appointive selection of
supreme court justices." Of the twenty-six states that initially select their supreme
court justices by gubernatorial appointment or gubernatorial nomination, twentytwo require that appointees or nominees come from a list of candidates provided by

2 Id. (Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania elect for ten-year terms; Alabama and Texas elect for
six-year terms; New Mexico elects for an eight-year term; and West Virginia elects for a twelve-year
term).
21 Id. (explaining that Alabama, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia elect
supreme court judges by partisan, statewide election, while Illinois and Louisiana elect justices by
partisan election within districts).
2 Id. (indicating that Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania hold partisan retention elections for
state supreme court justices). See alo Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected-A Survey of the
JudicialSelection Processin the United States, 75 MICH. BJ. 904, 905-06 (1996).
' See Methods ofJudicial Selection, supra note 16 (explaining that justices in South Carolina and
Virginia are initially selected by direct legislative election, while justices in Connecticut are chosen
through gubernatorial selection of nominees recommended by a judicial selection commission and
subsequent legislative appointment).
24 S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (LEXIS through 2016 session).
25
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (LEXIS through 2016 Regular Session of the General Assembly).
' Deja, supra note 22, at 904-06.
' See Methods of Judicidal Selection, supra note 16 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming).
2 See generallyid.
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a judicial nominating or selection commission.Y Of these twenty-two states, six
require their state senate to confirm or consent to a gubernatorial appointee or
nominee. 0 Connecticut and Rhode Island require both chambers of the legislature
to appoint or confirm gubernatorial nominees forwarded by a nominating
commission." In New Hampshire, the governor nominates justices to the supreme
court from a list of selection commission recommendations; thereafter, a
constitutionally authorized executive council must vote to appoint the governor's
nominee.3 2 In thirteen states, a governor's appointment of a nominee named by a
judicial nominating or selection commission benches that nominee on the state
33
supreme court.
In four states, gubernatorial appointment of supreme court justices need not
consider a list of nominating or selection commission recommendations.3 Yet, in
all four of these states, checks on gubernatorial appointive selection exist.s For
example, in California, a commission on judicial appointments must confirm
gubernatorial appointments to the state supreme court.' In Massachusetts, an
executive council must approve gubernatorial appointees to the state's supreme
court.3 ' Finally, in Maine and New Jersey, although nominees to the supreme court
need not come from a list of candidates, the state senate must confirm
38
gubernatorial appointees.
Sixteen of the twenty-six states that use gubernatorial appointment or
gubernatorial nomination for initial supreme court selection use retention elections
for judicial reselection. 3 Scholars call judicial selection by gubernatorial
appointment followed by retention election the "Missouri Plan."4 In these sixteen
"Missouri Plan" states, initial terms-of-service prior to retention election range
from "until next general election at least thirty days [after selection]" to twelve
years. 41 Subsequent terms-of-service for a supreme court justice retained by the
42
electorate range from six years to twelve years. Vermont, which initially uses
9Id. (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming).
01 Id. (Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New York, Utah, and Vermont).

3 Id.

Id. Members of New Hampshire's constitutionally authorized executive council are partisanlyand
popularly elected each biennium. Id. (emphasis added).
3 Id. (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming).
34 Id. (California, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey).
32

3s Id

6Id.

3 Id. (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming).
0 See Deja, supra note 22, at 905.
4See Methods ofJudicialSelection, supra note 16 (Tennessee and California, respectively).
42 Id. (explaining that subsequent terms-of-service for justices in Arizona, Florida, Kansas,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont are six years, but twelve years in California.).
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gubernatorial appointment to select its supreme court justices, empowers the state
legislature to retain supreme court incumbents.4 3 Hawaii uses the same nominating
commission that provided its governor with supreme court nominees to retain
incumbents for subsequent supreme court service." Four states-Delaware, Maine,
New Jersey, and New York-replicate their appointive selection procedure to retain
incumbents for subsequent judicial service. 45 Finally, three states that use
gubernatorial appointment or nomination for initial supreme court selection use no
retention procedure, because initially selected supreme court justices serve for life or
until some statutorily-specified age.46

II. WHY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROPOSED ELECTIVE SELECTION

"

"[Aifteral, the removal of the statejudiciaryfrom elective politicshad been
a goal ofmany since the 1940s.
Identifying the judicial selection method used in Kentucky proves easier than
understanding exactly why Kentucky chose the selection system it uses today.
Indeed, although primary and secondary sources reviewing the passage of the 1974
Judicial Article exist, they offer limited insight into the legislative intent that
informs the Judicial Article. Legislative Research Commission Library research, for
example, produced legislative materials detailing the floor passage of the Judicial
Article in March 1974. Those resources, however, do not report committee markup of, or floor debate on, the Article." In fact, the Final Interim Reports, which
catalogue the minutes of the Joint Interim Committee meetings that occur between
biannual legislative sessions, do not predate 1974. 49 Committee debate and
testimony from the 1972-1973 Joint Interim Judiciary Committee-the winter
interim that preceded the Judicial Article's passage, during which Committee
43 Id.
4Id.
45

Id

id. (stating justices serve until age 70 in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, while justices in
Rhode Island serve life terms).
' Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 32.
4 Relevant Kentucky legislative history records were sparse. While past legislative records are
available online, available records do not predate 1997. See Past Legislative Records, KY. LEGIS.,
http://wwwJ.rcky.gov/record/pastses.htm [https//perma.cc/N745-TKHOJ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
Monthly Interim Reports available online do not predate 2008. See PastInterim Records, KY. LEGIS.,
http*//www.1rc.ky.gov/record/pastint.htm [https://perma.cc/L8AX-HLYE] (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
According to Legislative Research Commission staff, audio and video recordings of and transcripts from
committee proceedings and floor debate do not predate the 1990s.
9 On file in the Legislative Research Commission Library, the 1974-1975 Final Interim Reports
are Volume 1 in the FinalInterim Reports series. See Peggy Kirg Lqgislative Reference Library, KY.
LEGIS., http://wwwlrc.ky.gov/lrc/library.htm [https://perma.cc/RDZ4-9WWH] (last visited Jan. 17,
2017). Since Kentucky constitutionally amended the legislative calendar in 2000, the General Assembly
now meets annually for as many as thirty legislative days in odd-numbered years and as many as fortyfive legislative days in even-numbered years. See KY. CONST. § 36 (LEXIS through the 2016
Legislative Session).
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members would have considered legislation pre-filed for the 1974 biannual
sessionso-is unreported." Here, answering why Kentucky proposed nonpartisan
elective selection relies primarily on (1) the history of judicial selection in Kentucky
and (2) secondary source authority and the recollections of a Judicial Article cosponsor.
A. Istory offudicialSelection in Kentucky
To appreciate why Kentucky proposed and arrived at nonpartisan elective
selection of its Supreme Court justices, one must consider where it had been prior
to passage of the Judicial Article. Kentucky's first constitution provided for
gubernatorial appointment of state judges, including the three justices of the
52
Kentucky Court of Appeals, which was then Kentucky's highest appellate court.
Lifetime appointive selection to the state's highest court survived until 1850."
Legislative records reveal that Kentuckians so disfavored lifetime appointive
selection that a Constitutional Convention was assembled to frame the state's third
constitution.5 4 Under the third constitution, four Court of Appeals justices stood
for partisan election to eight-year terms. s Partisan election persisted until the
Judicial Article restructured the Kentucky Court ofJustice.5 6
Reforming an overworked state judiciary inspired Kentucky's 1966 draft
Constitution.s" Notably, the 1966 draft restructured the Kentucky Court of Justice
into a four-tiered judiciary, atop of which a Supreme Court of appointed justices
sat.s" The 1966 draft Constitution also proposed that after three years' service on
the Kentucky Supreme Court, justices would account for their "record of
performance" in a retention election in which voters might reject or retain the
incumbent. s9 "Weighed down by many unpopular provisions," voters soundly

5 As Metzmeier describes, the General Assembly established interim committees tasked with
handling policy ahead of biennial sessions in 1968. See Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 33. The Judicial
Article shared interim committee attention with penal code revisions. Id
s On file in the Legislative Research Commission Library, the 1974-1975 Final Interim Reports
are Volume 1 in the Fmal Interim Reports series. See Peggy KUV Legislative Reference Library, supra
note 49.
52 See Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 16-17; Legislative Research Comm'n, Citizens' Guide to the
Kentucky Constitution: Research Report No. 137, at 61, http-//www.1rc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/rrl37.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NV6-VXVU] (last updated June 2013).
* SeeMetzmeier, supra note 8, at 22.
See Legislative Research Comm'n, supra note 52, at 61 ("[Kentuckians] remained dissatisfied
with the system of appointing for life judges who had the power to decide that a legislative measure was
unconstitutional. This dissatisfaction was a primary reason for calling the Constitutional Convention of
1850.").
1 Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 22.
*Seeid. at 23.
* Seeid. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
5 Legislative Research Comm'n, supra note 52, at 64.
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defeated the 1966 draft Constitution at the polls. 6 The Judicial Article's
subsequent reformation efforts tellingly omitted the 1966 draft's "Missouri Plan."
Since ratification of its first constitution, Kentucky has selected its Supreme
Court justices either by gubernatorial appointment or popular election.
Constitutional revision exercises proposed "Missouri Plan" select as an
alternative-appointment followed by retention election. The voters rejected it.. In
November 1975, nonpartisan elective selection won the day, which Kentucky has
since used to fill its Supreme Court. For 167 of its 225 years, then, Kentucky has
elected the justices of its highest court. 6
B. Secondary Sources and "Recollections"
Where Kentucky has been on judicial selection, though, does not exactly answer
why it preserved elective selection in the Judicial Article. Without appreciable
guidance from legislative history, answering why Kentucky proposed elective
selection in the Judicial Article instead relies on the recollections of those involved
with the Judicial Article's drafting, such as former state Senator and United States
Representative Carroll Hubbard, Jr.6 2
Initially, the draft Judicial Article did not prefer nonpartisan elective selection.
Following the electoral failure of the 1966 draft Constitution, nonprofit Kentucky
Citizens for Judicial Improvement ("KCJI") incorporated to more systematically
advocate for judicial reform." It set out to propose legislation that could pass the
General Assembly.' Funding granted to KCJI paid for polling commissioned to
measure the public's interest in and enthusiasm for judicial reform.6 s Specifically,
poll results found that 65% of Kentuckians preferred elective selection of state
judges.' Informed by public opinion and convinced by its pollster that provisions
opposed by 65% of the electorate would doom constitutional reform, KCJI
amended its draft Judicial Article to provide for elective selection of supreme court
justices.6 ' Although reformers did not initially prefer elective selection of supreme
court justices, their commitment to reform acquiesced to overwhelming public
preference for elective judicial selection.6 1 It seems that political calculation partly
6 Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 29. For example, Metzmeier mentions the unpopular inclusion in the
draft of a provision "abolishing many of [Kentucky's] 120 counties (and their respective county officials)."
Id. He notes, "While supporters of the new constitution had to convince voters to accept all of its
provisions, opponents only had to raise doubts about any single provision to secure a 'no' vote." Id.
61 See Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 29; see also Legislative Research Comm'n, supra note 52, at 5962.
62 See, e.g., Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 33-40, see alo Telephone Interview with the Honorable
Carroll Hubbard, Jr., former state Senator and United States Congressman from Kentucky (Nov. 13,
2015) (interview notes on file with author) [hereinafter Hubbard Interview].
'6 4 See Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 31.
Id.
65
Id.
6

Id. at 32.

67 Id.
6Id

(calling the KCJI's amendment to the draft article a "bow to public opinion").
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answers why the Judicial Article proposed elective selection of Kentucky's Supreme
Court justices.'
Legislative opposition to the KCJI's reforms organized when the General
Assembly took up the Judicial Article in January 1974.70 Co-sponsored in the
Kentucky Senate in part by Carroll Hubbard as Senate Bill 183, the Judicial Article
proposed a four-tiered Kentucky Court of Justice headed by an elected, nonpartisan supreme court.7 ' The chamber narrowly captured the three-fifths majority
required for constitutional amendments; it passed 24-13.72 Senator Hubbard
remembers the General Assembly preferring to preserve the electorate's
involvement in judicial selection. " He recalled that at that time, "Kentucky's
western judicial district would have elected a Democrat, while its south-central
judicial district would have elected a Republican."14 Hubbard believed that rather
than a candidate's political affiliation, "justices of the Supreme Court should be
chosen for their qualifications, regardless of their political party."" On the prospect
of gubernatorial appointive selection, Hubbard remembers worrying about political
patronage."6 "I feared that appointment to the Supreme Court would reflect the
Governor's appointments to boards and comiissions-[appointment of] those
who contributed the maximum to his campaign, his friends." 7
On March 15, 1974, Senate Bill 183 passed the Kentucky House of
Representatives by a vote of 79-4.78 Governor Wendell Ford signed the bill into
law later that month. 79 The electorate ratified it as an amendment to the Kentucky
Constitution in November 1975.'
These supplemental sources and Carroll Hubbard's recollections reveal two
answers as to why Kentucky proposed elective selection of its supreme court
justices: (1) polling showed overwhelming public support for elective selection, and
(2) appointive selection risked partisan division and political patronage. These
themes-consideration of the electorate and politicization-also answer what Part
IV addresses: why Kentucky should retain the system it adopted more than forty
years ago.

6
An editorial run in Louisvile Courier-journalinJanuary 1974 called "diluted" reform better than
none. Id. at 32-33 (citation omitted).
7 Id. at 34.
" Legis. Rec. vol. 11, no. 51, at 19 (1974) (Ky.) (Regular Session, Friday, April 12, 1974).

Id

72

I Hubbard Interview, supra note 62.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76

77

Id
Id

n Legis. Rec. vol. 11, no. 51, at 19 (1974) (Ky.) (Regular Session, Friday, April 12, 1974).
7 Metzmeier, supra note 8, at 34.
0 Id. at 37-38.
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III. WHETHER NONPARTISAN ELECTIVE SELECTION
WORKS EFFICACIOUSLY IN KENTUCKY
"lhavehadmany conversations with appellatejudges from otherstates about
theirmethod ofjudicialselection ... [T]hosejudges have assertedthat their system
is best; that only in their state has theperfect system ofjudicial selection been
found. I must confess that I share the view ofmy colleagues across this nation. In
Kentucky, we have the least flawed system ofjudicialselection.
Section A of Part III sets the criteria for measuring the efficacy of nonpartisan
elective selection. Section B establishes identifiers of over-politicization of
nonpartisan elective selection. Section C discusses the regulatory framework and
institutional controls that protect against over-politicization of Kentucky's Supreme
Court elections.
A. MeasuringEfficacy
Oftentimes, particularly with respect to politics, what works efficaciously proves
a subjective inquiry. For instance, whether an election works the way that it
should work might depend on the relatedness of the party affiliations of the elected
and the person asked; whether an election becomes over-politicized might depend
on what factors one subjectively deems relevant to apply. So, whether nonpartisan
election works in Kentucky as an efficacious judicial selection method of supreme
court justices can depend entirely upon one's measurement of "efficacy."
Accordingly, to measure the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection as a
judicial selection method of Kentucky Supreme Court justices, criteria are required.
Many jurists and scholars consider an independent, impartial" bench the goal of
judicial selection.' The United States Supreme Court, for example, "want[s] judges

8 Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, ContestableJudicialElections: MaintainingRespectabilty in
the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 6 (2005).
" In political science, "political efficacy" can mean one's subjective determination as "o his or her
competence to, with a political decision, effectuate a desired objective or outcome-"the estimation that
the person itself is able to successfully act to gain the objective." See Frank Reichert, Pobtical
Competences and Political Participation:On the Role of "Objective" Potical Knowledge, Pobical
Reasoning, and Subjective PobicalCompetence in EarlyAdulthood, 9 J. SOC. SCI. EDUC., no. 4, 2010,
at 63, 65.
" See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-79 (2002) (articulating various
meanings of "impartiality"). This Article uses "impartial" to mean "[without] bias for or against
either party to the proceeding," the definition guided by Webster's New International Dictionary and
seemingly adopted by the Court in White. Id. at 775-76.
See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal ofImpartialty, 97 IOWA L.
REv. 181, 183-84 (2011) (footnotes and citations omitted) ("The significance of impartiality is reflected
in the American Bar Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for
UnitedStatesJudges,which both set forth a general standard requiring judicial disqualification from any
proceeding 'in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'"); Jeffrey D. Jackson, The
Selection ofJudges in Kansas: A Comparison of Systems, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Jan. 2000, at 32, 35
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to be impartial."ss Influenced and persuaded by these authorities, this scholarship
ties the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection to its promotion of independent,
impartial Kentucky Supreme Court justices.
B. Polticizationand Its Effect on Efficacy
While all judicial elections are inherently political,' over-politicization of a
judicial election can affect its efficacy in promoting an impartial, independent
bench. For example, according to Justice O'Connor, "contested elections generally
entail campaigning. And campaigning for a judicial post today can require
substantial funds . . . . [R]elying on campaign donations may leave judges feeling
indebted to certain parties or interest groups."' Also, money from non-party
interest groups, notably television advertisement expenditures, politicizes judicial
elections, and "[t]he rising tide of money in judicial elections can undermine
judges' independence by forcing them to seek campaign dollars." " Finally,
according to former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, campaigning
singularly on issues likely to come before the court or committing to judicial
decision prior to election compromises impartiality, too.' He suggests:
Persons who undertake the task of administering justice
impartially should not be required ... to finance campaigns or to
curry favor of voters by making predictions of promises about
how they will decide cases before they have heard any evidence or

("Judicial independence has been called 'the backbone of the American democracy', the 'bulwark of the
Constitution,' and 'an indispensable element of our constitutional framework and its commitment to
freedom.'") (footnotes and citations omitted); O'Connor, supra note 2, at 479-80, 486-88 (identifying
the ensuring of judicial impartiality and guarding of judicial independence as goals of judicial selection);
see also Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts? The High PriceofJudicialElections, 3
Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 29, 29 (2008) ("1 have always thought, from my earliest youth till now that the
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people, was an ignorant,
a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.") (footnotes and citations omitted).
5 White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 See Joseph Tanfani, JudicialElections GettingMore Political with New Campagn Spending,
LA. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-judicialelections-20141123-story.html [https-//perma.cc/5RMX-JQEY] ("When you have an election, you're
already in the political realm."); Politics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/politics [https://perma.cc/6C4Z-W4HQJ (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) (defining
"political" as "activities that relate to influencing the actions and policies of a government or getting and
keeping power in a government").
8 White, 536 U.S. at 789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also O'Connor,
supra note 2, at 486-89 (citing the infusion of politics into electoral judicial selection and studies that
show that an overwhelming majority of the public believes campaign contributions influence state
judges).
" See Tanfani, supra note 86.
9 See Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims A Tennessee Judge, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archivelifestyle/1996/11/26/injustice-claims-a-tennesseejudge/fDa28c33-fcbl-4clb-9471-2d5704d56a88/ [https-//perma.cc/23JB-3NPC].
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argument. A campaign promise to be [']tough on crime' or to
[']enforce the death penalty' is evidence of bias that should
disqualify a candidate from sitting in criminal cases."

"

As justices of the United States Supreme Court and judicial election commentary
note, at a point, the politics inherent in judicial elective selection can compromise
the impartiality and independence of the bench."
Over-politicization of nonpartisan elective selection is readily identifiable. Four
identifiers are: (1) multi-million-dollar spending, (2) participation by third-party
special interest groups; (3) television advertisements, particularly if negative; and
(4) singularized or inordinate focus on a contentious, "litmus test" legal or political
issue, such as abortion, capital punishment, characterization of a candidate as "soft
on crime," or the like.' None of the identifiers alone especially politicizes a judicial
election. However, together, and in inordinate amounts, a judicial election may
become over-politicized.
Observers and the United States Supreme Court have pointed to these four
identifiers as indicators of over-politicization of elective judicial selection.' For
example, Los Angeles Times reporter Joseph Tanfani points to multi-milliondollar spending by third-party groups organized to affect judicial elections.9
Tanfani cites a study that counted $14 million spent on television advertisements
by judicial campaigns in 2014."s Noteworthy, he mentions a particularly "rough"
attack advertisement aired against an incumbent justice in North Carolina."
The retention election involving Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny J.
White highlights over-politicization by issue campaigning. In the months before
her retention election, Justice White cast a concurring vote to affirm the
convictions of but overturn the death penalty sentence for a rapist-murderer
criminal defendant." A third-party special interest group, Tennessee Conservative
Union, orchestrated a no-vote campaign against Justice White. 9 The message
broadcast by the Union suggested, "[The criminal defendant] won't be getting the
punishment he deserves. Thanks to Penny White. " The Union further claimed,
"[White] felt the crime wasn't heinous enough for the death penalty, so she struck

90 Id.

" Id. SeegeneralyO'Connor,supra note 2.
9 This Article need not provide a laundry list of the "litmus test" issues that might overly politicize
a judicial election. Whether a particular legal or political issue qualifies as a "litmus test" issue in a
judicial election exceeds the narrow focus of this scholarship.
9 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (litmus test, namely
abortion); Tanfani, supra note 86 (multi-million-dollar spending and litmus test campaigning).
' See Tanfani, supra note 86.
95 Id

% Id.
9' See Bills, supra note 84, at 44-45; McCarthy, supra note 89.

9 See Bills, supra note 84, at 45; McCarthy, supra note 8990.
" See McCarthy, supra note 89 (internal quotations omitted).
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it down."'" "[O]n the basis of a single ... decision," the Tennessee electorate voted
not to retain Justice White.' 01 Singularized focus on capital punishment as a litmus
test for Justice White's retention to the Tennessee Supreme Court overly
politicized the election.
Finally, Republcan Party ofMinnesora v. White involved a candidate for state
supreme court who, while campaigning, distributed literature "criticizing several
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and
abortion."' 0 2 Finding that candidate's campaign literature "touched on disputed
legal or political issues," the Court focused on a particular few printed criticisms,
including one of "a decision requiring public financing of abortions for poor women
0
as 'unprecedented' and a 'pro-abortion stance.'" ' Inordinately issue campaigning
against abortion as a litmus test for qualification might also over-politicize a
judicial election.
In sum, over-politicization of judicial election can impair an elected justice's
impartiality and compromise his or her independence. Certain identifiers,
particularly in inordinate amounts, indicate over-politicization: multi-milliondollar spending, campaign participation by third-party special interest groups; use
of television advertisements, particularly if negative; and singularized focus on
contentious, litmus test legal or political issues.

C. Kentucky's RegulatoryFrameworkand Controls on Pobticization
The framework that regulates nonpartisan elective selection of the Kentucky
Supreme Court controls over-politicization. Specifically, (1) constitutional
enumerations, (2) state statutory provisions, and (3) administrative oversight
promote impartiality and independence and ensure that selection by nonpartisan
selection works efficaciously.
i. Constitutional Enumerations Regulating Kentucky Supreme Court Elections
The Kentucky Constitution effectively controls over-politicization of
nonpartisan elective selection. It controls over-politicization by (1) conditioning
candidate qualification; (2) restricting voters' electoral and political influence; and
(3) prohibiting political party office holding.
First, the Kentucky Constitution preconditions supreme court justice
qualification. To qualify, a candidate must have United States citizenship; at least
two years' residence in the district for which he or she hopes to qualify; and must
be licensed to practice law in Kentucky and have at least eight years' bar licensure

t
'o Id. (internal quotations omitted).
11 Bills, supra note 84, at 45.
102

103

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
Id. at 771.
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altogether. '0 These qualification regulations remove, in part, potential
politicization of a candidate's fitness for service.
Second, the Kentucky Constitution restricts the electorate's influence by
providing for limited, district-specific supreme court elections. 10s Rather than
standing statewide, candidates for Kentucky Supreme Court stand in one of seven
districts.'" Only voters qualified to vote in a district may vote for that district's
candidate(s). District-specific elections limit the political participation and
influence of citizens residing outside the district.
Third, and perhaps most important, according to the Kentucky Constitution,
candidates for supreme court run on a non-partisan basis.'0 7 Elsewhere, the state
Constitution prohibits Kentucky Supreme Court justices from "hold[ing] any office
in a political party or organization." 08 These enumerations inoculate official
political party association both at the ballot box and away from the bench.
The constitutional framework for filing vacancies on the Kentucky Supreme
Court promotes impartiality and independence of the bench, too. When a vacancy
on the Kentucky Supreme Court arises, the state Constitution empowers the
governor to fill the vacancy by "appointment . . . from a list of three names
presented to him by the appropriate judicial nominating commission."'" However,
"[i]f the Governor fails to make an appointment from the list within sixty days
from the date it is presented to him, the appointment shall be made from the same
list by the chief justice of the Supreme Court."" 0 The membership of the "judicial
nominating commission for the Supreme Court" protects against overpoliticization."
[The] commission shall consist of seven members, one of whom
shall be the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who shall be
chairman. Two members of each commission shall be members
of the bar, who shall be elected by their fellow members. The
other four members shall be appointed by the Governor from
among persons not members of the bar, and these four shall
include at least two members of each of the two political parties
of the Commonwealth having the largest number of voters ....
No person shall be elected or appointed a member of a judicial
nominating commission who holds any other public office or any
office in a political party or organization." 2

§ 122 (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative Session).
See id. §§ 110(4), 117.

104 KY. CONST.

Ios

106 Id

o'Id. § 117.
Id. § 123.

i

'n

Id. § 118(1).

SId.

I
n2

See id. § 118(2).
Id.
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The vacancy procedure promotes the impartiality and independence of the
Kentucky Supreme Court. It appropriately checks the governor's participation in
selecting temporary justices, using a politically diverse nominating commission to
screen candidates, chaired by the Kentucky Supreme Court Chief Justice, to whom
a Code of Judicial Conduct applies."' The governor cannot stack the Commission
either totally with his or her patrons or disproportionately with political associates
because both political parties must have representation on the Commission. And
still, the electorate, albeit inclusive only of district bar members, plays a role by
selecting two of the seven commissioners.114
ii. Statutory Provisions Regulating Kentucky Supreme Court Elections
The General Assembly promulgated candidate-behavior prohibitions and
general judicial election regulations. 115 Specifically, Kentucky law (1) caps
individual contributions to judicial candidates, limiting the hard money that filters
into nonpartisan elective selection; (2) requires judicial candidates to self-report
financial interests and disclose conflicts of interest; and (3) enables the Kentucky
6
Supreme Court to promulgate self-regulating controls on judicial selection."
First, a statutory contributions cap protects against the influx of hard money
into supreme court elections, protecting against over-politicization. "No candidate,
slate of candidates, campaign committee, political issues committee, nor anyone
acting on their behalf, shall accept a contribution of more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) from any person, permanent committee, or contributing
organization in any one (1) election."" Conversely, "[n]o person, permanent
committee, or contributing organization shall contribute more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) to any one (1) candidate, campaign committee, political issues
committee, nor anyone acting on their behalf, in any one (1) election.""'s Canon 5
of the Kentucky Judicial Code prohibits candidates from personally soliciting
contributions as well as limits authorized fundraising to the 180-day period before
an election. n' When paired together, the individual contribution cap and
fundraising window control hard-money politicization of supreme court elections
by limiting fundraising to a defined period and a maximum of $1,000 increments.

1 13

SeegenerallyKY. SUP. CT. R 4.300.
KY. CONST. § 118(2) (LEXIS through the 2016 Regular Session). The electorate's involvement
reflects the General Assembly's 1974 emphasis on including voters in judicial selection.
1c Segenerally KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300.
116 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.740(1)(a)c), 121.150(6) (Lexis 2016); KY. SUP. CT. R 1.010.
117 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.150(6) (Lexis 2016).
us Id. The statutory language "in any one election" permits a contributor to max-out his or her
donation in both a primary election and a general election. A candidate could, then, accept $2,000 from
any one contributor as a primary and subsequent general election candidate. See id. at § 121.015(2)
(Lexis 2016).
n1 KY. SUP. CT. R 4.300, Canon 5(B)(2).
114
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Second, Kentucky law requires judicial candidates to self-report financial and
other conflicting interests.' 20 Candidates for Kentucky Supreme Court justice must
self-report certain financial and fiduciary information: financial interests worth
more than $1,000 and those of his or her spouse, dependents, and employer; his or
her fiduciary obligations and employment and those of his or her spouse and
dependents, regardless of income received; and all entities to which the candidate,
or his or her employer, furnished services worth more than $1,000.121 Kentucky law
makes all candidate disclosures public record for inspection. 12 Non-filing of
required disclosures can disqualify a candidate and void his or her candidacy."
These regulations regarding fiduciary duties and all conflicts of interest, designed to
ensure the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection, enable the electorate to inspect
and evaluate a candidate's capacity for impartiality and independence.
Third, the Kentucky General Assembly not only promulgates its own statutory
restrictions of supreme court elections, but it also empowers the Kentucky Court of
Justice to self-regulate. Indeed, the administrative and policy-making authority of
the Kentucky Court of Justice vests in its supreme court.1 24 The Kentucky Supreme
Court Rules impose a general obligation on judges to "actively participate in
establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and .. . observe
those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be
preserved."'2 5 Incumbent justices, whether or not campaigning, must "respect and
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'" Moreover, "[a]
judge shall not allow . . . political or other relationships to impair the judge's
objectivity.... nor . . . convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge."' 2 7
The Kentucky Supreme Court Rules specifically regulate how judges and
judicial candidates may engage in political activity. For instance, judges and judicial
candidates "shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and shall
encourage members of the candidate's family to adhere to the same standards of
political conduct."'" With respect to raising campaign contributions, the Rules
state:
A judge or a candidate for judicial office shall not personally
solicit campaign funds, but may establish committees of
responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of
m See id at Canon 4(H); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.710(1), 61.740 (Lexis 2016).
m § 61.740(1)(a)c).
mId. § 61.750.
- Id. § 61.770.
4
Ky. SUP. CT. R 1.010.
m2KY. Sup. CT. R. 4300, Canon 1. Also, the inclusion of this Canon in the Kentucky Supreme
Court Rules corroborates the judicial selection's goal of judicial "independence."
6Id. Canon 2(A).
m ld. Canon 2(D).
m Id. Canon 5(B)(1)(a).
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funds for the campaign and to obtain public statements of
support for the candidacy. A candidate's committees may not
solicit funds for the campaign earlier than 180 days before a
primary election. A candidate's committees may not solicit funds
after a general election."
Unfortunately, other Rules regulating judicial candidates' political activity have
suffered under recent federal court jurisprudence. `0 For example, Winter v.
Wolnitzek undermines Kentucky's protections against over-politicization of
nonpartisan elective selections. Applying First Amendment political speech analysis,
Winter invalidated several provisions of the Canons in the Kentucky Supreme
Court Rules for unconstitutional vagueness."'' Provisions declared unconstitutional,
in whole or in part, include Canon 5(A)(1) and Canon 5(B)(1).' 32 This Article,
however, need not discuss the merits of the court's reasoning in Wtiner because the
decision leaves room for restoring the Canons' safeguards against overpoliticization of nonpartisan elective selection of Kentucky's Supreme Court.
Indeed, although Winter destabilizes the current scheme for regulating
politicization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections, it does not entirely preclude
the Kentucky Court of Justice's regulation of judges and judicial candidates'
political conduct and speech. So long as re-imagined regulations narrowly advance
a compelling government interest, and in the case of political speech, restrictions
constrain no more speech than necessary, the Kentucky Supreme Court can
continue to use self-regulatory rulemaking to guard against over-politicization of its
elections.13 1

2 Id. Canon 5(B)(2). Carey v. Woitzek invalidated an earlier version of Canon 5's solicitation
clause for over-broadly proscribing "solicit[ation of] campaign finds." 614 F.3d 189, 204")7 (6th Cir.
2010). The revised and narrowed solicitation clause in Canon 5 contemplates fundraising by committees
established by the judicial candidate. See KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(B)(2). The narrowed
solicitation clause in Canon 5 was "revised in accordance with Wiliams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, No.

13-1499, [135 S. Ct. 1656] (2015)." Commentary to KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(B)(2) (Lexis
2016). Decided in April 2015, Wiiams-Yulee held that a solicitation clause that prohibited personal
solicitation by judicial candidates but permitted fundraising by their established committees did not

violate the First Amendment. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). Canon
5(B)(2) follows closely the language of the clause at issue in Wlliams-Yulee. Compare KY. SUP. CT. R.

4.300, Canon 5(B)(2), with Wiliams-YuLe, 135 S. Ct. at 1663.
m See generally Chris Stewart, The Grab for the Gavel: Are JudicialRaces in Kentucky Headed

Down

the

Road

of

Party

Pobtics?,

U.

OF

KY.

(Nov.

4,

2014),

http://www.uky.edu/electionlaw/analysis/grab-gavel-are-judicial-races-kentucky-headed-down-roadparty-politics [https://perma.cc/CUR3-ZY8M].
131 See Winter v. Woluitzek, No. 14-119-ART, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *2-3, *69-70
(E.D. Ky. May 13, 2016).
132 Id. at *70.

1` Id. at *19-21 ("If the only thing [Canon 5(A)(1)(a)] forbid was a candidate saying that he is a
party's official nominee, then it would likely be constitutional."). Winter explicitly recognizes
diminishing the reliance on political parties in judicial selection, promoting nonpartisan elections, and
preventing judges and judicial candidates from lying as compelling interests. Id. at *20-21, *21 n.5.
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Thankfully, the text of Winter guides reconstruction of the invalidated Canons
toward constitutionality,"' and the Kentucky Supreme Court would be wise to
follow Winter in its redrafting.
Winter declared Canon 5(A)(1)(a)
"unconstitutionally vague.""'3 Under Canon 5(A)(1)(a), neither a judge nor a
candidate for judge may campaign as a member of a political organization.136 The
prohibition works to remove a candidate's political party association from the
campaign stump. Winter took issue primarily with the Kentucky Supreme Court's
interpretation of the prohibition, an interpretation to which the federal court had
an obligation to give effect.' 7 The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted the
Canon 5(A)(1)(a) to mean, "[A judicial] candidate shall not portray himself, either
directly or by implication, as the official nominee of a political party.""' According
to Winter, while "most of the Canon is completely unobjectionable . . . . [t]he
problem lies in the three words: 'or by implication.'"' 9 "[T]he problem is that those
words are too vague" because they "fail[] to give [a] person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."'" The federal district court
opined, "Ifthe only thing [Canon 5(A)(1)(a)] forbid was a candidate saying that he
is a party's official nominee, then it would likely be constitutional."' 4 1 Even after
Winter, the Kentucky Supreme Court may prohibit judicial candidates from
directly identifying themselves as official party nominees, a laudable safeguard
against the direct and official association between judicial candidates and political
parties. To protect against over-politicization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections,
revision of Canon 5(A)(1)(a) should consider the drafting note from Winter.14 2
Although challenged for its constitutionality in Winter, the Eastern District of
Kentucky upheld Canon 5(A)(1)(b). 4 3 The provision prohibits judges and judicial
candidates from "act[ing] as a leader or hold[ing] any office in a political
organization." '" Canon 5(A)(1)(b) guards against the commandeering of
judgeships and nonpartisan judicial campaigns by active political party officials.
Winter also upheld a protection against over-politicization in Canon
5(A)(1)(c).14 This provision prohibits judges and judicial candidates from "publicly
endors[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate for public office."'" While the Canon may
not bar a judge or judicial candidate "from making speeches for or against" a

1 See id at *22-23 ("The problem lies in the three words: 'or by implication.'").
131 Id. at *24-27.
KY. Sup. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(A)(1)(a).
m Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *19-20, *22.
131 Id. at *23.
136

140 Id. at *23 (citations omitted).
141

Id. at *21.

14 See id. at *23-27 ("The problem lies in the three words: 'or by implication.' Specifically, the
problem is that those words are too vague.").
143 Id. at *45, *70.
" KY. SUP. CT. R 4.300, Canon 5(A)(1)(b).
141 Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *37.
" KY. SUP. CT. R 4.300, Canon 5(A)(1)(c).
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political party, it may preclude him or her "from publicly endorsing a candidate for
political office."' 7 As Winter reminds, an endorsement is a powerful political tool,
commonly "exchanged between political actors on a quid pro quo basis . . . . to
affect a separate political campaign, or . . . assume a role as a political

'

powerbroker."' 4 8 The rule against endorsement "addresses a judge's entry into the
political arena on behalf ofhis partisan comrades."149 Without such a rule, public
confidence in the judiciary might suffer.so Winter, by upholding the endorsement
rule in Canon 5(A)(1)(c), preserves an important safeguard against overpoliticization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections, precluding judges and judicial
candidates from using the endorsement "to secure their elections (or help others get
elected) as part of a partisan political machine." 1
In addition to the identification clause in Canon 5(A)(1)(a), Winter also
2
invalidated important safeguards in Canon 5(B)(1)(c).' 5 Under the provision, a
judge or judicial candidate:
[S]hall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that
are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office; and shall
not knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
misrepresent any candidate's identity, qualifications, present
position, or make any other false or misleading statements.1s3
The federal district court deemed part of the "pledges, promises, or commitments"
clause unconstitutional.1 54 According to the court, while "[tihe state surely may
14 Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *37 (quotations and internal citations omitted).
Id. at *33 (quoting Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 984 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at *34 (quoting Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 984 (7th Cir. 2010)).
150 See id. at *33-34.
e5 Id. at *34-35.
152 Id. at *53-55.
153 Ky. Sup. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(B)(1)(c). With respect to the Kentucky Supreme Court's
discretion to regulate judicial campaigning, at least three cases are worth mentioning. First, JC.JD. v.
R.JC.R. held that a Kentucky Supreme Court Rule that "prohibits alldiscussion of ajudicial candidate's
views on disputed legal or political issues . . . violates fundamental state and federal constitutional free
speech rights . . . ." 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991). Second, Carey v. Woritzek invalidated a
provision of Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 5 that prohibited a judicial candidate from
disclosing his or her party affiliation "in any form of advertising, or when speaking to a gathering." 614
F.3d 189, 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently
redrafted Canon 5 to comply with Carey See Commentary to KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(A)(1)
(stating a judicial candidate "may publicly affiliate with a political organization but may not campaign as
a member of a political organization"). Third, in Republican Partyofthnnesota v. White, the United
States Supreme Court held that a supreme court canon "prohibiting candidates for judicial election from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment." 536 U.S.
765, 788 (2002). White informed the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Carey. See Carey, 614
F.3d at 194.
1" Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *52-55.
1s
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prohibit a judge [or judicial candidate] from making a pledge in connection with a
'case or controversy,'" it may not prevent him or her from making a promise with
respect to "issues.""ss "[T]he state has no interest in preventing judges from
showing bias as to particular issues."15' While Winter risks over-politicization of
elections involving particular issues to which judges and judicial candidates may
show bias, the decision reinforces the Kentucky Supreme Court's power to regulate
public impartiality as to actual cases and controversies, "in favor or against
litigants.""5 7
In a decision with unclear implications, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
restored the "commitments clause" of Canon 5, commending Kentucky's efforts to
revise and narrow its application to judges and judicial candidates' political
speech.1' The Canon's commentary seems to save it, excluding from the clause's
coverage judges and judicial candidates' commitments on issues not inconsistent
with impartiality. 15' Albeit a reversal of the district court's findings on the
commitments clause of Canon 5, the Sixth Circuit's decision came with
instructions that the Kentucky Supreme Court adopt a construction of the clause
that "yields greater certainty-and firmer constitutionality," and "resolve[s] the
open questions [on the issues covered by the Canon] in a way that honors
candidates' rights under the [F]irst [A]mendment."'" The Kentucky Supreme
Court would be wise to heed the Sixth Circuit's instructions.
Winter also facially preserved the prohibition against false speech in Canon
5(B)(l)(c). 61 The district court accepted as compelling Kentucky's interest in
keeping unscrupulous, dishonest judges off the bench, "imagin[ing] a large number
of false statements that Kentucky would be entitled to forbid."' 6 2 The rule against
false speech ensures that neither judges nor judicial candidates knowingly or
recklessly use false speech to over-politicize nonpartisan elective selection.
Kentucky Supreme Court Rules appropriately regulate judicial elections and the
political behavior of judges and judicial candidates. They broadly impose judicial
duties of impartiality, independence, and integrity, which help ensure nonpartisan
elective selection works efficaciously by producing impartial, independent jurists.
Specific prohibitions against official political party involvement, personal

I
6

Id. at *54.

1s

Id.

"'

See Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2016).
Sup. Ct. R. 4300, Canon 5(B)(1)(c)).

1' See id. (citing Commentary to Ky.
16

Id. at 695 (citation omitted).

16See Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *58-59. The federal district court found the
plaintiffs' as-applied challenge unripe. Id. at *63-64. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the ban against false speech, as it applied to the plaintiff, "outstrips the Commonwealth's interest in
ensuring candidates don't tell knowing lies and thus fails to give candidates the 'breathing space'
necessary to free debate." Winter, 834 F.3d at 693 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60-61

(1982)).
162

See Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *61.
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solicitation of contributions, public endorsement of candidates, and false speech
also protect against over-politicization of nonpartisan judicial selection.
Although most of Kentucky's statutory controls safeguard against overpoliticization, the Kentucky Supreme Court must work to revise some of its Rules
undermined by recent federal jurisprudence. If it fails to plug the holes left by
Winter, it risks the elective selection of its justices becoming "more and more
partisan."' Those revising the Rules must be "surgically precise" in drafting rules
that constrain judges and judicial candidates' political activity so to ensure the Rules
survive First Amendment strict scrutiny.'" As such, the Kentucky Supreme Court
would be wise to follow directions from Winter.
iii. Administrative Oversight of Kentucky Supreme Court Elections
Administrative oversight protects against over-politicization. Kentucky law
establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission, empowered to penalize judicial
behavior violative of the Judicial Code of Conduct. 16s The power of the
Commission to discipline supreme court justice candidates promotes accountability
for judicial impartiality and independence. The membership of the Commission,
which consists of four elected representatives-one each from the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, Circuit Courts, District Courts, and Kentucky Bar Association-and
two non-legal citizen representatives appointed by the governor, minimizes overpoliticization.'" As with the Judicial Nominating Commission reviewed above, the
governor cannot completely stack the Judicial Conduct Commission with his or her
patrons. And still, the electorate, albeit indirectly through its elected judges, plays a
role in naming three of the six commissioners.
Contributive to judicial accountability, the Judicial Conduct Commission
publishes annual reports chronicling the complaints filed on, and any public actions
levied against, justices and judicial candidates.' 6 ' For example, the Commission
made public its Order of Public Reprimand against judicial candidate Dana M.
Cohen, who, after becoming a judicial candidate, "liked" a Facebook post that
publicly endorsed a political candidate and made a political contribution, in
6
violation Kentucky Supreme Court Canon 5(A)(1)(c) and (d).1 1

1"3 See Stewart, supra note 130.
Winter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64044, at *69.
Sec generallyKY. SUP. CT. R 4.020.
166
Judicial
Conduct
Commission,
KY.GOV,
http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5BX9-X5MY]
(last visited Jan. 19, 2017); see also KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.040-4.070.
167
See
Pubic
Information,
KY.GOV,
http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Pages/publicinformation.aspx
[https*//perma.cc/9BLM-QLHY] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
16 Agreed Order of Public Reprimand, Commonwealth of Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, In the
Matter
of
Dana
M.
Cohen
(July
21,
2014),
http-//courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Documents/PublicInformation/PublicReprimandC
ohen.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDX5-FKWX].
164
16s
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Provisions in the Kentucky Constitution, statutory contribution caps and
disclosure requirements, and disciplinary oversight of candidates form a framework
that controls against over-politicization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections by
promoting impartiality and independence. Stated differently, Kentucky law ensures
the efficacy ofjudicial selection of Kentucky's Supreme Court justices.
IV. WHY KENTUCKY SHOULD RETAIN NONPARTISAN ELECTIVE SELECTION

'Kentucky... hasnot faced any serious monetary threats to the
4
independence andimpartialtyofitsjudiciary
."'
Section A of this Part applies the identifiers of over-politicization to Kentucky's
Supreme Court elections held from 2000-2015. Section B uses the results of
Section A to describe why Kentucky should retain nonpartisan elective selection
and not adopt two of the alternative selection methods proposed by scholars.
Section C offers additional reasons for retaining nonpartisan elective selection as
the method for selecting Kentucky's Supreme Court justices.
A. Application of the Over-PobticizationIdentifiers to
NonpartisanElective Selection in Kentucky
With an understanding of the framework that regulates nonpartisan elective
selection in Kentucky, one can apply the identifiers of over-politicization to
measure the efficacy of Kentucky's Supreme Court elections held from 2000-2015.
A joint study prepared by the Justice at Stake Campaign, the Brennan Center for
Justice, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics (hereinafter, Brennan
Center Study or Study) analyzes, among other things, Kentucky's Supreme Court
elections between 2000-2009.170 The Study uses electoral reports and news articles
to measure over-politicization of the Kentucky Supreme Court elections held after
2009.1" Application of the identifiers demonstrates that recent elections have not
become over-politicized to the point that the justices they produce compromise
impartiality and independence, the hallmark indicators of efficacy.
i. 2000-2009: Brennan Center Study
The Brennan Center Study charts "growing challenge[s] to the impartiality of
[the United States'] courts.'n According to the Study, trends of a compromised
national judiciary include: the astronomical influx of money into state supreme
169 Hardy, supra note 5, at 400.
70 See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL.,

THE NEw POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009:
DECADE OF CHANGE 6, 20, 27, 29, 87 (Charles Hall ed., 2010), www.brennancenter.org/page/-/JAS-

NPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF5P-U-B68].
171 See generaflyid.

1n Id. at 1.
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and costly television ads; and the emergence
to affect judicial electoral outcomes.173 The
growing challenges to judicial impartiality
the four identifiers of over-politicization of

a. Muldnmilion-DoflarSpending
According to the Brennan Center Study, twenty-nine contested state supreme
court elections spent nearly $175 million from 2000-2009.174 The Study seems to
focus on the top ten states for supreme court election spending, in which Kentucky
does not appear. 17s In fact, among the twenty-six states measured in the study,
Kentucky's Supreme Court election fundraising ranks fifteenth."' From 20002009, nineteen Kentucky Supreme Court candidates raised just over $3.5 million in
the aggregate.1 7 1 When extrapolated across eleven supreme court elections held
between 2000-2009, each race raised an average of $318,571, well below the
multimillion dollar spending identifier that indicates over-politicization of
nonpartisan elective selection. Even if one removes from the calculation the four
uncontested supreme court elections held in Kentucky between 2000-2009171, each
of the seven remaining contested supreme court elections raised, on average,
$500,612. 17 Whether or not accounting for actual electoral contest, the hard
money raised in Kentucky's 2000-2009 supreme court elections does not reach the
multimillion-dollar threshold that indicates over-politicization.
b. Participationby Third-PartySpecial Interest Groups
The Brennan Center Study only partially accounts for third-party interest group
participation in Kentucky Supreme Court elections between 2000-2009. For
example, of the total television advertisement spending in the eleven Kentucky
Supreme Court elections from 2000-2009, non-candidate groups accounted for S0

Se generallyid.
Id. at 11.
17s Id. at 6, 12. Eight of the top ten fuindraising states use partisan elections to select their supreme
court justices. Seeid. at 17,20.
" See id. at 6. Tenth among the "Top 10" fundraising states, West Virginia's fifteen judicial
candidates raised more than two times what Kentucky's nineteen judicial candidates raised. Id.
17
1 Id. at 6.
17s Uncontested races were held in 2002, 2006, and 2008. Election Results, ELECT.KY.GOV,
173

174

http://elect.ky.gov/results/2000-2009/Pages/default.aspx

[https*//perma.cc/H2T8-EB3B]

(last visited

Jan. 20, 2017) (providing links for each individual in which election results are available for every
supreme court election held between 2000 and 2009).
179 See id. (showing uncontested races were held in 2002, 2006, and 2008). The $500,612 figure
seems reasonable considering the Brennan Center Study showed a combined fundraising total of
$515,711 for the four Kentucky Supreme Court justice candidates on the ballot in 2008. See SAMPLE
ET AL., supranote 170, at 20.
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in spending. 's The Study does not catalogue non-television participation by
interest groups. Third-party interest groups tend to focus their resources on
television advertising expenditures.' It seems inconsequential whether third-party
groups that did not participate in television advertising between 2000-2009
alternatively participated in Kentucky's Supreme Court elections. 8 2 From what
limited data is available, Kentucky's Supreme Court elections from 2000-2009 did
not reflect over-politicization from participation by third-party special interest
groups.
c. Television Advertisements, ParticularlyifNegative
From 2000-2009, nineteen candidates for Kentucky Supreme Court justice ran
2,895 total television advertisements," an average of 152 airings per candidate.
The number of total advertisements ranks Kentucky tenth among twenty states
whose high-court candidates ran television advertisements." In analyzing the
Kentucky Supreme Court elections from 2008, the Brennan Center Study found a
total of 334 television advertisements occurred; none of the ads were negative and
none of them were sponsored by third-party interest groups.'s Whether 152
airings per candidate during a months-long election period over-politicizes
nonpartisan elective selection might divide reasonable people. But three of
Kentucky's eleven supreme court elections (and two of seven contested elections)
included no negative television advertising, which might tilt toward the elections
held from 2000-2009 not becoming over-politicized. Television advertisements, as
a sole identifier, do not clearly characterize the 2000-2009 Kentucky Supreme
Court elections as either over-politicized or not over-politicized.
d. "Litmus Test"Issue Campag-ng
The Brennan Center Study measures "litmus test" issue campaigning according
to television advertisements aired in the three Kentucky Supreme Court elections
held in 2008.'" Of the 334 television airings in those elections, none focused
no SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 170, at 27. Only the candidates incurred costs associated with
television advertisements; "Group" and "Party" contributors spent $0 in the three Kentucky Supreme
Court elections held in 2008. See id. at 29.
181 Non-candidate groups accounted for 40% of all television advertising from 2000-2009. Id. at 2.
12 Even if a third-party organization chose to invest in non-television advertisements, the
framework that regulates nonpartisan elective selection statutorily caps what a judicial candidate may
accept from contributing organization. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.150(6) (LEXJS through the
2016 Legislative Session). Over-politicization from $1000 non-television-advertisement expenditures
seems unlikely.
183 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 170, at 27.
18

Se id.

18.
See id. at 87. The author acknowledges the limitations of the Brennan Center Study's data.
Where appropriate, this Article uses data analyzing three Kentucky Supreme Court elections in 2008 as
an indicator
of over-politicization of all eleven Kentucky Supreme Court elections held from 2000-2009.
6

18

See generallyid.

2016-2017

What the Polls Produce: Nonpartisan Elective Selection

479

singularly or inordinately on a contentious, litmus test legal or political issue.ur Of
those airings, 111 addressed criminal justice, criticism of decisions, and family
values; the other 223 airings were "traditional" in nature and tenor.'" The Brennan
Center Study ranks all 334 airings as "promot[ing]" the subject of the
advertisement and not attacking the subject's opponent.'" An absence of litmus
test issue campaigning from three of eleven Kentucky Supreme Court elections
held from 2000-2009 might tilt toward the elections not becoming overpoliticized.'90
With respect to multimillion dollar campaign spending and participation by
third-party special interest groups, Kentucky Supreme Court elections held from
2000-2009 did not become over-politicized. With respect to two other identifiers
of over-politicization-television advertising, particularly if negative, and litmus
test issue campaigning-available data indicates that the three Kentucky Supreme
Court elections held in 2008 did not become over-politicized. 191 Especially
considering the protections against over-politicization enumerated in the
framework that regulates nonpartisan elective selection, in sum, the Brennan
Center Study seems to show that from 2000-2009, nonpartisan election selection
preserved impartiality and independence and worked efficaciously as a method for
selecting Kentucky Supreme Court justices.
ii. 2010-Present
Since 2009, Kentucky has held seven elections for a seat on the Kentucky
Supreme Court, four of them contested.1 92 Using available electoral reports and
news articles, this Subsection measures the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection
in those three contested elections.' 93
a. Multmillion-Dollar Spending
In their 2012 campaigns for election to Kentucky's 7th Supreme Court District,
candidates Will T. Scott and Janet Stumbo reported raising $303,440 and
187

1

89

See id. at 87.
Id.

'" This conclusion especially considers the statutory rules that regulate judicial candidates' political
activity, including their representations of an opponent's qualifications and positions. See KY. SUP. CT.
R 4.300, Canon 5(B)(1)(a), (c).
191 See supra text accompanying notesl83-190.
192 See Election Results, supra note 178 (providing links to official election results compiled by the
Kentucky State Board of Elections reveals Kentucky Supreme Court elections held from 2010 to
November 2015).
193 Since 2009, Kentucky has seen four contested elections for seats on its supreme court: in 2012,
former Justice Janet L. Stumbo challenged incumbent Justice Will T. Scott; in 2014, Teresa
Cunningham contested incumbent Justice Michelle Keller; in 2015, Samuel T. Wright, HI challenged
former Justice Janet L. Stumbo; and in 2016, Laurance VanMeter contested Glenn Acree. See id.
Information related to the 2016 election was not readily available at the time this article went to print.
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$111,360, respectively. 194 Data from the Brennan Center does not report any
spending by third-party special interest groups in the 2012 Scott-Stumbo
election.19s In 2014, candidates Michelle Keller and Teresa Cunningham reported
raising $99,797 and $13,767, respectively."' Finally, Kentucky Registry of Election
Finance records show that candidates Stumbo and Samuel Wright, in their 2015
campaigns, raised $171,969.63 and $119,596.00, respectively.1" Since 2009, none
of the candidates' fundraising has approached the multimillion-dollar spending
threshold that indicates over-politicization of nonpartisan elective selection.
b. Participationby Third-PartySpecial Interest Groups
For the 2012 election, the Brennan Center Study reports no television
advertisement spending by third-party interest groups, '" where a third-party
special interest group would generally focus its judicial election resources. Records
of participation by third-party groups in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 contested
elections are not available. '" Overall, available data is insufficient to measure
whether, from 2010 to 2015, participation by third-party interest groups in
Kentucky's contested Supreme Court elections over-politicized the nonpartisan
elective selection system. The over-politicization identifier cuts neither for nor
against the efficacy of nonpartisan elective selection as a method for selecting
Kentucky Supreme Court justices.

194 Bill Estep, Supreme Courtjustice Will T Scott Defeats Court ofAppeals fudge janet Stumbo,
LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER
(Nov.
6,
2012,
8:35
PM),
http://www.kentucky.com/2012/11/06/2398434/supreme-cort-justice-will-t-scott.html
[https//perma.cc/LM3P-XD94].
Buying Time 2012: Kentucky (Sep. 12, 2012), BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2012-kentucky [https*//perma.cc/PYY6-5ECU].
I%
Kentucky
Supreme
Court
Elections,
2014,
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG,
http-//ballotpedia.org/KentuckySupremeCourtelections,_2014
[https*//perma.cc/G6BH-5RZ8]
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
197 Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, Candidate Search (by election date),
KYREF.STATE.KY.US, http-//www.kref.state.ky.us/krefsearch/ [https//perma.cc/PU9S-SZFB] (follow
hyperlink for Candidate Search "By Election date"; select "11/03/2015" as date of election; select
"Supreme Court Judge" as office sought) (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
I's See Buying Time: State by State Spending2012, BRENNAN CTR. FORJUSTICE (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-state-state-spending-2012
[https//perma.cc/3ANV-9FPK].
'" See generally Buying Time 2016: Kentucky, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov.
11, 2016),
httpsd/www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2016-kentucky [https://perma.cc/QQ6D-538C];
Buying Time 2015: Kentucky, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2015-kentucky
[https://perma.cc/Q29A-292R];
Buying
Time
2014,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2014 [https://perma.cc/G3AB-U2X4].
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c. Television Advertisements, ParticularlyifNegative
According to the Brennan Center, in 2012, candidates Scott and Stumbo ran
275 airings of ten different television advertisements-six by Stumbo, including
three critical of Scott, and four by Scott, including three advertisements attacking
or criticizing Stumbo.3 Of note, Stumbo likened Scott's television advertising to a
"'media assault' of negative ads." 201 Brennan Center records of television
advertisements run in the 2014 contested election are not available. Finally, the
Brennan Center identifies two television advertisements run in the 2015 electionboth by Stumbo, neither negative.202 Also, in 2015, candidate Wright apparently
ran a recycled criticism of Stumbo, stating she "sided with criminals nearly 60
203
percent of the time."

In summary, since 2010, television advertising has appeared in at least two of
Kentucky's three contested supreme court elections. Three candidates in the two
contested elections used negative television advertisements. The winners of both
contested races ran advertisements attacking or criticizing their opponents. The
data identifies the three contested Kentucky Supreme Court elections held since
2009 as over-politicized.
d. "Litmus Test"Issue Campaigning
Justice Scott's television advertisements in 2012 indicate issue campaigning.
Scott's television advertisements painted his opponent as "liberal and soft on
crime." 01 Particularly, advertisements criticized opponent Stumbo for "sid[ing]
with criminals 59 percent of the time." 205 Because "soft on crime" attacks dominate
75 percent of the television advertisements run by Scott against Stumbo, 206 this
scholarship can comfortably call Scott's focus on a contentious, litmus test legal or
political issue inordinate.
According to the CincinnatiEnquirer, the 2014 contested election "stretched
the limits" of nonpartisan elective selection. 20 7 "The Boone County Republican
Party . . . [ran] an anti-abortion newspaper ad against Keller on Cunningham's

m Buying Time: State by State Spending 2012, supra note 198; Buying Time 2012: Kentucky,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 12, 2012), http-//www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time2012-kentucky [https://perma.cc/Tr2EH-VTAH].
2
See Estep, supra note 194.
See Buying Time 2015: Kentucky, supra note 199.
Editorial, Janet Stumbo for Supreme Court, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Oct. 27, 2015,
12:00 AM), http-//www.kentucky.com/2015/10/27/4106886/janet-stumbo-for-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/4PUZ-XZ7F].
1 See Estep, supra note 194.
SSee Buying Time 2012: Kentucky, supra note 200.
See id
2 Bitter Supreme Court Election Drags on in Court, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (March 7, 2015,
5
10:10 AM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/1ocal/northem-ky/201 /03/06/supreme-court[https*//perma.cc/62GQ-9HUTJX].
election-spat/24529407/
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behalf." 208 The anti-abortion messaging against Keller signaled not only
participation by a non-candidate group, but also campaigning on a contentious,
litmus test legal or political issue. The Enquirercalls the Boone County Republican
Party's activity "unprecedented," and this scholarship feels comfortable categorizing
the 2014 issue campaigning against Keller inordinate, if not singularized. 209
The "soft on crime" issue campaigning from 2012 reemerged against Stumbo in
2015. However, data does not demonstrate singularized or inordinate focus on the
contentious, litmus test issue. Generally, however, contested campaigns for
Kentucky Supreme Court justice inordinately focused on contentious, litmus test
legal or political issues from 2010-2015.
In sum, two identifiers indicate that the three contested Kentucky Supreme
Court elections held after 2009 became over-politicized, while one identifier
suggests the elections did not become over-politicized. The fourth identifier is
inconclusive. The disparity of the results might suggest that, after 2009,
nonpartisan elective selection began to compromise the impartiality and
independence of justices elected to the Kentucky Supreme Court, thus working
inefficaciously.
iii. Conclusions on the Efficacy of Nonpartisan Elective
Selection From 2000-2009
Available data shows neither the efficacy nor inefficacy of nonpartisan elective
selection as a method for promoting impartiality and independence. Since 2000, it
might seem that nonpartisan elective selection has trended toward overpoliticization. Admittedly, issue campaigning and negative television advertising
have become more prevalent in contested elections for the Kentucky Supreme
Court. However, the fatal effectiveness of issue campaigning seen in Justice Penny
White's electoral rejection to the Tennessee Supreme Court has not yet mired to
Kentucky. For example, in 2014 Justice Keller withstood an unprecedented,
politically organized, litmus test assault. Also, since 2000, fundraising by Kentucky
Supreme Court candidates and non-participation by third-party special interest
groups in those elections have remained relatively constant and under the
multimillion dollar threshold.

2

Id.

0 Supreme Court Election Spat Escalates, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:02 PM),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/crime/crime-and-courts/2015/03/18/ky-supreme-courtlawsuit/24959977/ (https://perma.cc/274T-ZLLU]. For an expanded description of the Boone County
Republican Party's campaign against Keller, including a screenshot of the advertisement, see Scott
Wartman, Abortion Issue Heats Up Supreme Court Race, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 27, 2014,
11:40
AM),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/27/abortion-issue-dividessupreme-court-candidates-gop/18000733/ [https://perma.cc/B745-CXQP]. Despite the activity by the
Boone County Republican Party, and perhaps important to the reader's conclusions regarding the effects
of litmus test issue campaigning, Keller defeated Cunningham. See Bitter Supreme Court Election
Dragson in Court, supra note 207.
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To more conclusively answer whether nonpartisan elective selection works
efficaciously in Kentucky, the Judicial Conduct Commission's annual reports prove
informative. Between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, the Judicial Conduct
Commission received 1,519 complaints. 210 Of these, at least 51 alleged political or
campaign conduct impropriety by judicial candidates or justices. 211 Of course, these
figures represent complaints against all candidates and judges, not particularized to
the Kentucky Supreme Court justice candidates of interest here. In Fiscal Year
2015 alone, at least five complaints related to campaign misconduct or political
impropriety resulted in discipline.2 12 The infrequency of campaign misconduct and
political impropriety supports at least two conclusions: (1) relatively little election
behavior moves the Judicial Conduct Commission to question the impartiality and
independence of elected judges; and (2) in practice, the constitutional and statutory
framework that regulates nonpartisan elective selection effectively discourages or
protects against behavior that over-politicizes Kentucky Supreme Court elections.
In sum, perceived over-politicization of nonpartisan elective selection actually
resulted in minimal conduct violative of the framework that regulates judicial
selection of the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The Kentucky Supreme Court elections surely have trended toward overpoliticization, particularly because of negative television advertising and issue
campaigning. Apparent from annual reports published by the Judicial Conduct
Commission, though, it seems that the framework that regulates nonpartisan
elective selection in Kentucky and administrative oversight of judicial candidates
preserve the impartiality and independence of the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Application of the identifiers of over-politicization to Kentucky's Supreme Court
elections since 2000 indicates that nonpartisan elective selection, even if recently
marginally over-politicized, works efficaciously as a method for selecting impartial,
independent justices.
B. Kentucky Need Not Reject NonpartisanElective Selection for
ProposedAlternative Selection Methods
Critics of nonpartisan elective selection as an efficacious method for selecting
Kentucky Supreme Court justices prefer alternative selection methods. 213 For
210

See 2014/2015 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2013/2014 Ky. JUD. CONDUCT

COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2012/2013 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2011/2012 KY. JUD.

CONDUCT COMMN, ANN. REP.; 2010/2011 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.
211

See 2014/2015 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2013/2014 Ky. JUD. CONDUCT

COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2012/2013 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 201112012 KY. JUD.
CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.; 2010/2011 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP.
212

See 2014-2015 KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM'N, ANN. REP. The disciplinary reprimands do not
name any candidates for Kentucky Supreme Court justice. See, e.g., Ky. JuD. CONDUCT COMM'N,
AGREED ORDER OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND, DANA M. COHEN (Jul. 21, 2014).
2 3
Andrew Mize cites the impact of campaign contributions in judicial elections in support of the
need for a "new judicial selection regime." See Mize, supra note 5, at 410-12. He suggests abolishing
nonpartisan elective selection for an "appointment-election-retention framework" Id. at 411. This
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example, Benjamin Hardy proposes two alternatives to nonpartisan elective
selection. 21 4 Hardy prefers merit selection "[m]inus [r]etention [e]lections." 215 If
Kentucky must retain nonpartisan elective selection, Hardy supports a public
financing scheme.2 6 Neither of Hardy's alternative selection systems promotes
impartiality and independence better than nonpartisan elective selection. Thus,
neither proves a more efficacious selection method.
i. Merit Selection Minus Retention Elections
To adequately disprove Hardy's "merit minus" selection system as a more
efficacious alternative to nonpartisan elective selection, one must break down the
system into its two components: merit selection and reselection using something
other than retention election&
The first component of merit selection would use a judicial nominating
commission, whose members the governor appoints, to name and present
candidates for gubernatorial appointment to the Kentucky Supreme Court. 217
Under merit selection, a governor gets two stabs at political patronage-first in his
or her appointments of members to the nominating commission and second in his
or her appointment of one of the commission's recommended candidates. 2 18 In
Kentucky, for example, the governor appoints a controlling majority of the
Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission.2 1 9 An idealist might mock
attribution of corruption to Kentucky's governorship; a realist might responsively
direct him to a 2014 Harvard University study that identified "Kentucky's state
Article does not specifically consider Mize's alternative. Also, this Article does not address partisan
elective selection as an alternative to nonpartisan elective selection. If one sets impartiality and
independence as benchmarks, replacing nonpartisan elective selection with partisanelective selection
confounds. Threats to impartiality and independence attributed to partisan judicial selection outnumber
those attributed to nonpartisan election models. See Jackson, supra note 84, at 35-40 (attributing to
partisan election selective dilution of judicial impartiality and independence); SAMPLE ET AL., supra
note 170, at 6-7 (identifying eight of the top ten campaign findraising states as partisan elective
selection states and noting that Arkansas and North Carolina switched partisan selection systems for
nonpartisan elective selection in 2002). For example, campaign contributions flood into partisan judicial
elections in higher quantities than nonpartisan judicial elections. See id In partisan elective selection
states, television advertisements are nastier and third-party special interest groups play more actively.
See, eg., id. at 38-39. More critically, and threatening to efficacy as a judicial selection method, partisan
elective selection inherently identifies a candidate by the candidate's political party affiliation. O'Connor,
supra note 2, at 486 ("No amount of reform will remove the politics inherent in partisan judicial
elections because they specifically aim to infuse politics into the law."). Its inherent affixation of
partisanship onto the electoral ballot; frequent association with multi-million-dollar findraising hauls
and negative television advertising, and appeal to third-party special interest players, multi-milliondollar fundraising efforts, render it inarguably less efficacious than alternative judicial selection methods,
including nonpartisan elective selection.
214 See Hardy, supra note 5, at 400-03.
215
Id. at 40("2.
216 Id. at 402-03.

See Deja, supra note 22, at 904, 907.
See Id
219 KY. CONST. § 118(2) (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative
Session).
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government ... among the most [politically] corrupt in the country," and, notably,
ranked Kentucky's executive branch "among the five worst," according to "hundreds
of news and investigative reporters covering state politics."2 20 Anecdotally, the
Republican Party of Kentucky boldly charged Democratic Governor Steve Beshear
with "selling" appointments to state boards and commissions, particularly public
universities' boards of trustees. 221 Perhaps more fundamentally, proposing merit
selection by the governor ignores one of the concerns that inspired Senator Carroll
Hubbard to propose nonpartisan elective selection in 1974. 222 Merit selection,
because it involves politically calculative executives' appointments to nominating
commissions and, thereafter, to state supreme courts, does not dearly protect
against over-politicization of judicial selection.
The second component of Hardy's "merit minus" alternative suggests that
rather than retention elections, Kentucky should use a judicial nominating
commission or its General Assembly for reselection for service on the supreme
court.223 Abolishing retention elections admittedly removes the risk of electoral
over-politicization, but reselection by a judicial nominating commission or the
General Assembly still threatens impartiality and independence. 224 The same risks
of political patronage that attend initial appointive selection to the Kentucky
Supreme Court would attend the nominating commission's decisions on retention.
Kentucky's governor appoints a controlling majority of the Supreme Court Judicial
Nominating Commission.2 25 Empowering a judicial nominating commission with
decisions on whom to retain does not eradicate politicization of selecting Kentucky
Supreme Court justices.
A decision on retention inside the General Assembly does not obviously avoid
over-politicization either. "Legislative selection does not offer any obvious
Joe Sonka, Harvard Study: Kentucky' State Government One of the Most Corpt in the
Country, INSIDER LOUISVILLE (Dec. 8, 2014, 2:25 PM), bttp-//insiderlouisville.com/metro/harvardstudy-kentuckys-state-government-one-corrupt-country/ [https://perma.cc/A5L9-5KTB].
22
1JameS McNair, Despite Law Requiring PoiticalBaiance, Boards of UI U of L and KCTCS
3:30 PM),
Loaded with Democrats, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Aug. 6, 2015,
bttp://www.kentucky.com/2015/08/06/3977129/despite-law-requiring-political.htrnl

[https://perma.cc/J2E2-HN5E].
222 See Hubbard Interview, supra note 62.

m Hardy, supra note 5, at 401.
a Over-politicization of judicial

selection does not indiscriminately bypass retention elections.
Retention elections: (1) require judicial candidates to fundraise as well as campaign on the issues and on
their records; (2) can involve television advertising-, and (3) may cause candidates to open their doors to
third-party interest groups, including negative campaigning. See id. ("[S]pecial interest groups have
realized that they can have a big impact on whether a judge facing retention election is able to maintain
his seat."); Lambert, supra note 81, at 4 ("[I]n recent years, a new phenomenon has descended on
retention election politics in the form of single-issue interest groups and their ability to spend
substantial sums of money to attack a sitting judge on the basis of a single decision or line of decisions.").
As an example, the Brennan Center points to Pennsylvania, an elective selection state that uses retention
elections for subsequent supreme court service. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 170, at 20. Also, one cannot
overlook the aforementioned Justice Penny White summary, another example of over-politicization of a
retention election. See Bills, supra note 84, at 44-45; McCarthy, supra note 90.

2 KY. CONST. § 118(2) (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative Session).
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advantages over other systems." 2 2 Just as Kentucky's governor might measure
politics in deciding whom to appoint to the supreme court, "[p]olitical
considerations are likely to operate just as vigorously on legislators" in deciding
which justices to retain." For instance, "the final decision [whether to retain a
justice] would likely be strongly affected by legislative alliances, traditional voting
blocs, and the power of the leadership in each house to force a particular choice.""
Both components of Hardy's "merit minus" alternative to nonpartisan election
instill politicization into the selection of Kentucky Supreme Court justices. This
alternative does not promote impartiality and independence of justices any better
than nonpartisan elective selection. Additionally, the "merit minus" alternative
proves most disagreeable because it entirely strips Kentucky voters of a right to
decide the makeup of their supreme court. Either in partisan or nonpartisan
elections, Kentuckians have enjoyed the right to decide the justices of the state's
highest court for 165 years. 2 9 Stripping Kentuckians of their electoral right to
select supreme court justices ignores the weight the General Assembly accorded
public opinion when it proposed nonpartisan elective selection in 1974. To deprive
the electorate of a voting right constitutionally conferred in 1850 offends the
democratic process. 230 These reasons answer why Kentucky should retain
nonpartisan elective selection and reject the "merit minus" alternative proposed by

Hardy.
ii. Public Financing for Nonpartisan Elective Selection
Hardy's second proposed alternative to nonpartisan elective selection also
attracts criticism.23 Hardy proposes public financing for all nonpartisan judicial
elections in Kentucky from a Clean Judicial Election Fund grown by income tax
refund check-offs, unspent campaign contributions from previous campaigns, and
state bar association contributions.32 Public financing for status quo nonpartisan
elective selection does little to better promote impartiality and independence. In

26

Judge Leslie

(2002).
22 7

Southwick, The Least ofEvils forjudicialSelection, 21 MISS. C.L. REV. 209, 218

d
ms Id.
M SeeMetzmeier, supra note 8, at 22-23.
ao Adopting any alternative to nonpartisan elective selection requires amending Kentucky's
Constitution. See KY. CONST. § 256 (LEXIS through the 2016 Legislative Session). Similar efforts
were met with electoral doom. See Lambert, supra note 81, at 7 ("Citizens firmly refuse to give up their
right to elect their judges.").
231 See Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The EndangeredBalanceBetween
Impartial Courts and JudicialElection Campagns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1229 (2008)
("There is no aspect of the electoral system of choosing judges that has drawn more vehement and
justifiable criticism than the raising of campaign funds, particularly from lawyers and litigants likely to
appear before the court.") (quoting Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Penn., 944
F.2d 137, 145 (3d Cir. 1991)).
32 See Hardy, supra note 5, at 399-400, 402.
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fact, as Professor Charles Gardner Geyh contends, public financing might
contribute to over-politicization of nonpartisan elective selection."
Public financing would not promote the impartiality and independence of the
Kentucky Supreme Court any better than nonpartisan elective selection. For
instance, Hardy's public financing scheme would not entirely eliminate a judicial
candidate's need to fundraise and spend-an identifier of over-politicizationwhich compromises impartiality and independence. Even where partial public
financing is available, judicial candidates "must continue to raise significant sums of
money from lawyers and organizations with an interest in the outcomes of cases the
judges will be deciding."' Also, public financing does not restrict fundraising or
expenditures by third-party special interest groups, another identifier of overpoliticization. Finally, public financing does not proscribe candidates' and special
interests' abilities to issue-campaign on litmus test legal and political issues. In fact,
public financing might contribute to over-politicization by making available funds
so that candidates can organize and carry out a judicial campaign, perhaps engaging
in the over-politicization that available campaign funds enable. According to Geyh:
To the extent that the availability of public money makes running
for elective office more attractive, publicly financed judicial
elections will tend to increase competition for judicial office ....
[I]ncreased competition may undermine ongoing efforts to cool
judicial campaign rhetoric and dissuade candidates and the
electorate from compromising judicial independence by turning
elections into referenda on the popularity of incumbent judges'
isolated decisions.2s
While it might bring more candidates into the judicial electoral arena, public
financing does little to promote impartiality and independence any better than
traditional, privately financed, nonpartisan elective selection.
Even if public financing were able to better ensure impartiality and
independence, Hardy's proposal acknowledges its own shortcomings: dire
economic obligations, a lack of political enthusiasm, and opposition by taxpayers

m See generally Charles Gardner Geyb, Publcly FinancedJudicialElections: An Overview, 34
Loy. LA. L. REv. 1467 (2001).
23 Id. at 1479.
2 Id. at 1480. Roy Schotland, invoking Deborah Goldberg of the Brennan Center, spins the
argument. See Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 231, at 1256 ("Although we generally believe that
more competition is better, we should not so easily leap to that conclusion in proposing structures to
regulate judicial elections. In jurisdictions that have already managed to secure a diverse and qualified
bench, we may in fact want to discourage competition.").
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effectively kill its political likelihood. 6 Moreover, some scholars attack public
financing schemes for coercing political speech.23 7
In support of his proposed alternatives, Hardy miscalculates the infusion of
money into Kentucky Supreme Court elections. Rather than focusing on electionspecific dollars, Hardy points to aggregated Kentucky Supreme Court findraising
to support his claim that "Kentucky's Nonpartisan Judicial Elections Fail to
Guarantee the Perception of Impartiality and Independence."s Having had only a
handful of contested supreme court races since 2000, and comparatively modest
fundraising by candidates in its contested elections,2 9 Kentucky simply has not
suffered the threats to impartiality and independence that Hardy attributes to the
infusion of money into state supreme court elections. 24
In sum, neither selection method proposed by Hardy proves a more efficacious
method for selecting justices to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Neither alternative
promotes impartiality and independence any better than nonpartisan elective
selection. In fact, merit selection and retention by a nominating commission or the
General Assembly risk over-politicization of decisions on who joins and stays on
the Kentucky Supreme Court. Public financing might contribute to overpoliticization, too, by making funding available that enables campaign activity that
compromises impartiality and independence. Thus, Kentucky should retain
nonpartisan elective selection of its supreme court justices.

&

36 See Hardy, supra note 5, at 399; see also Geyh, supra note 233, at 1480-81. ("Public financing
proposals raise a variety of issues ... but the most critical among them is whether the political will can
be found to commit the public funds necessary to make public financing systems solvent and
workable."); Lambert, supra note 81, at 6-7 ("We have all heard the mantra of opposition: public
financing of political campaigns is 'welfare for politicians.' I am confident that phrase would be changed
to 'welfare for judges.'").
2
See Hardy, supra note 5, at 399; see also David Wilson, Comment, North Carolina's Public
Funding of State Judicial Races: Innovative Wave of the Future or Band-Aid for a Fatally Flawed
System ?, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REv. 13, 14 (2010) ("The question with regard to public financing systems
always comes down to whether the system essentially coerces candidates to participate.").
2 See Hardy, supra note 5, at 393-95.
2
Hardy uses a 2004 $9.3 million election to the Illinois Supreme Court anecdotally. See id. at 393.
As Section V.A., infda, shows, since 2000, no contested election for Kentucky Supreme Court justice
has exceeded $450,000 in combined fundraising by candidates.
24 Hardy recognizes that "Kentucky 'has been spared the financial arms race that typifies the
funding of judicial election campaigns in many other states.'" Id. at 395 (quoting Paul J. De Muniz
Philip Schradle, A Modst Proposalfor Selection of Oregon Judges, 75 ALA. L. REv. 1753, 1754
(2012)). He posits, though, that "Kentucky should [not] sit back and [should] consider reforming its
current method of judicial selection," as state neighbors suffer "exorbitant spending, the involvement of
national special interest groups, and a blizzard of misleading attack ads that mask true interests of the
sponsors [in their judicial elections]." Id. at 395-96 (quoting Paul J. De Muniz & Philip Schradle, A
Modest Proposalfor Selection of Oregon Judges, 75 ALA. L. REv. 1753, 1754 (2012)). Hardy's urge
that Kentucky redesign supreme court selection at the expense of nonpartisan election and shelter from
some impending storm before seeing the lightening conflates other states' nonpartisan elective selection
woes with judicial selection of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at 396. He misunderstands that
meteorologists occasionally miss.
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C. OtherReasons Why Kentucky Should Retain NonpartisanElective Selection
Outside efficacy, other reasons support Kentucky's retention of nonpartisan
elective selection. First, the selection system has persisted for more than forty years,
which suggests an absent political appetite for redesigning judicial selection. Since
ratification of the Judicial Article in November 1975, nonpartisan elective selection
of Kentucky Supreme Court justices has survived without amendment; no
fundamental provision of the Judicial Article has been altered.24 ' Reminiscent of an
242
age-old adage, Kentucky should keep what few consider broken.
Second, and fully worth considering beyond the space afforded here, Kentucky
should retain nonpartisan elective selection because voters deserve a direct say in
the representatives whom effectuate public policy. Of course, a state supreme court
interprets and not enumerates law, but the limited "balls and strikes" function of
courts fails to persuade. 243 As can any high court simple majority, the Kentucky
Supreme Court can affirm or nullify public policy, and such power deserves
electoral input. Especially because it has enjoyed direct decision for 165 years, the
Kentucky electorate should retain the right to evaluate who qualifies to decide
public policy and, thereafter, whether a justice's public policy decisions align with
the voters' priorities and values. 2 4 Not entirely untouched, the theory that the
electorate deserves a direct say in state judicial selection informs the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Republcan PartyofMinnesota v. White. It held:
Yet, there is obvious merit in a state's deciding to elect its judges,
especially those judges who serve on its appellate courts. It is a
common notion that while the legislative and executive branches
under our system of separated powers make and enforce public
policy, it is the unique role of the judicial branch to interpret, and
be quite apart from making that policy.
But the reality is that "[tihe policymaking nature of appellate
courts is clear." Courts must often fill gaps created by legislation.
241

SeeMetzmeier, supra note 8, at 34-39.

242 The adage reminds of Winston Churchill's words: "[I]t has been said that democracy is the

worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." 7
WINSTON CHURCHILL, Speech in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, 7563, 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
The scholarship does not contend that nonpartisan elective selection is "perfect or all-wise," only that it
is, for Kentucky, better than "all those other forms [of judicial selection] that have been tried from time
to time." Id.
243 On the prospect of serving as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John G.
Roberts, Jr., described his duty as Chief Justice as "call[ing] balls and strikes." Roberts: My Job is to
Call Bails and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,' CNN (Sept. 12, 2005, 4:58 PM),
http-//www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ [https://perma.cc/LBP9-UL4J].
244 Of course, this argument begs the question, "Should, then, as federal public policymakers, the
nine justices of the United States Supreme Court stand for election, or the district and appellate justices
of the federal judiciary?", which the author neither intends to answer nor commits to answering here.
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And in particular, by virtue of what state appellate courts are
called upon to do in the scheme of state government, they find
themselves as a matter of course in a position to establish policy
for the state and her citizens. "At the [state] appellate level,
common-law functions such as the adoption of a comparative
fault standard, or the determination of a forced spousal share of
intestate property distribution, require a judiciary that is sensitive
to the views of state citizens." The courts' policy-making power is,
of course, ever subject to the power of the legislature to enact
statutes that override such policy. But that in no way diminishes
the reality that courts are involved in the policy process to an
extent that makes election of judges a reasonable alternative to
appointment. 245
In addition to efficacy, these reasons answer why Kentucky should retain
nonpartisan elective selection of its Supreme Court justices.
CONCLUSION

'Weare notgettingridof contestable elections. Itis understandablethat
when people callfor it, we get endless bills and endless editorials, but it is not only
a wheelspin, it is not only a waste oftime, it is injurious becauseit deflects
energy from what we can do."
The efficacy of judicial selection depends on its ability to promote an impartial
and independent judiciary. For forty years in Kentucky, nonpartisan elective
selection has survived as an efficacious method for selecting the justices of the
state's highest court. What the Kentucky General Assembly preferred in 1974direct electoral selection on a nonpartisan basis--proves appropriate today. Despite
forty years' efficacy, nonpartisan elective selection has not escaped critics.
Misplaced advocacy for alternative selection systems at the expense of nonpartisan
elective selection has appeared in legal scholarship nationwide. But what informs
opponents' attacks against nonpartisan elective selection -over-politicization by
multimillion dollar campaigns, negative television advertising by candidates and
third-party special interest groups, and litmus test issue-campaigning--simply has
not, at least to date, compromised judicial selection in Kentucky the way it might
have compromised nonpartisan elective selection in other states. Moreover,
alternatives proposed to replace nonpartisan elective selection do not obviously
work more efficaciously as a method for selecting the justices of the Kentucky

245

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

246 See Lambert, supra note 81, at 7 (quoting Roy Schotland, Keynote Address at the National

Symposium on Judicial Speech-Post- White (Feb. 24, 2005)).
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Supreme Court. Additionally, a comprehensive regulatory scheme controls overpoliticization of Kentucky Supreme Court elections.
The political environment might deteriorate such that revisions to the
framework regulating nonpartisan elective selection prove necessary. Recent court
precedent has already caused an imbalance, and to continue to efficaciously protect
against the over-politicization of nonpartisan elective selection, the Kentucky
Supreme Court certainly must respond. Importantly, critical pieces of the
framework regulating nonpartisan elective selection in Kentucky persist. Moreover,
enumerated authority to revise self-regulating rules suggests that Kentucky can dam
nonpartisan elective selection without abolishing the selection system entirely. So
long as the framework protecting against over-politicization survives and the
Kentucky Supreme Court remains responsive to attacks on judicial political speech
laws, Kentucky's nonpartisan elective selection scheme can produce impartial,
independent supreme court justices.

